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nent American political scientists has suggested the use of the
Hare system of the single transferable vote (popularly known
as "P. R.") in the election of state legislatures.2 It would seem,
in view of the difficulties encountered in operating the single-
member district system, that other methods of electing the Mis-
souri general assembly may be examined with profit by a con-
stitutional convention.29
J. L. D.
R. S. S.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST
OFFICE-HOLDING BY LEGISLATORS
COMMISSION ON INTERSTATE COOPERATION
The Constitution of California prohibits a member of the legis-
lature from holding any "office, trust, or employment" under the
state.' A statute established the California Commission on Inter-
state Cooperation, consisting of five members of each house of
the legislature, for the purpose of investigating legislative prob-
lems common to the several states. No compensation was pro-
vided, but members might receive reimbursement for necessary
expenses. Plaintiffs, members of the Commission, sought a writ
of mandate to compel defendant, Controller of the State of Cali-
fornia, to issue warrants reimbursing them for sums expended
in carrying out the duties of the Commission. In Parler v. Riley,
2
it was held that the writ would issue, since the legislature has
the right to legislate on the problems handled by the Commission;
and, when it has the right to act, it must be given the use of
entirely solved. For a suggestion which would seem more nearly to avoid
the dilemma, see Hilpert, supra, at 491: "If instead the total legislative
membership only were determined and these were allocated to each district
in each election upon the basis of the proportion the total vote of that dis-
trict bore, to the total vote of the state, not only would the objections stated
in the preceding paragraph be met, but a further inducement to 'get out
the vote,' would be provided. Or, the total legislative membership could
be left variable and the quota necessary to elect a member be determined-
each district's membership being dependent upon the number of times its
total vote fills this quota. A similar arrangement is provided in the new
New York City charter for determining the representation as among the
several boroughs, although the councilmanic representation of each borough
is elected by the Hare system of the single transferable vote."
28. National Municipal League, Model State Constitution (1941) §302.
29. This would seem to be more desirable since the proponents of these
election systems claim for them advantages other than merely the avoidance
of the perplexing problem discussed in this note.
1. Cal. Const. (1879) Art. IV, See. 19.
2. (1941) 113 P. (2d) 873.
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reasonable means to perform that act. The members of the Com-
mission therefore hold no new "office" within the constitutional
prohibition, and the Commission itself was a committee of the
legislature, properly created.
The creation of interstate cooperation commissions fills a great
need for intelligent handling of common state problems which are
similar enough to require similar solutions or which may require
concurrent action by several states. These commissioners have in
recent years been instrumental in preventing the erection of
interstate trade barriers, working out a practical and advan-
tageous system of state relief, developing a comprehensive and
constructive program of taxation, and fostering numerous other
advances in state legislation.3 The model commission, as pro-
posed by the Council of State Governments, includes ten legisla-
tors and five administrative officials, the former appointed by
the legislature, the latter by the governor.4 These commissions
have been established in forty-four states ;5 in forty-one they have
been established by legislative action-in the remaining three,
official agencies have been appointed by the governor pending the
establishment of a statutory commission., The commission in-
volved in the principal case was composed entirely of legislators.
The court held that the California Commission was properly
created as a committee of the legislature. A state legislature may,
either by single house or by concurrent resolution, appoint com-
mittees for the purpose of obtaining information concerning pro-
posed legislation, with power to sit during a session or during
recess.7 However, neither house may appoint a committee with
power to sit after adjournment.8 Some courts have held that
such interim committees may be appointed by concurrent resolu-
8. Council of State Governments, 4 Book of the States (1941-1942) 15 if.
4. Id., at 15.
5. The states which do not have such commissions are: Arizona; Idaho;
North Dakota; Washington.
6. Council of State Governments, 4 Book of the States (1941-1942) 15 f.
7. Dickinson v. Johnson (1915) 117 Ark. 582, 176 S. W. 116, L. R. A.
1915E, 496, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1067; In re Battelle (1929) 207 Cal. 227, 277
Pac. 725, 65 A. L. R. 1497; Fergus v. Russel (1915) 270 Ill. 304, 110 N. E.
180, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1120.
8. Tipton v. Parker (1903) 71 Ark. 193, 74 S. W. 298; State v. Guilbert
(1906) 75 Ohio St. 1, 78 N. E. 931; Commonwealth v. Costello (1912) 21
Pa. Dist. Rep. 232; Ex parte Caldwell (1906) 61 W. Va. 49, 55 S. E. 910,
10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 172, 11 Ann. Cas. 646; see State v. Childers (1923)
90 Okla. 11, 215 Pac. 773; Brown v. Brancato (1936) 321 Pa. 54, 184 At. 89,
The court in the Childers case, after reviewing the authorities, concluded
that this is the general state rule; but, for the federal rule, which is
contra, see McGrain v. Daugherty (1926) 273 U. S. 135, where it was held
that the Senate is a continuing body.
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tion,9 but usually a concurrent resolution in states so holding is
handled procedurally just as a statute10 Other courts have stated
that a committee with power to sit after adjournment can be
created only by statute. 1 The California court adopted the latter
view in Swing v. Riley.'2 The Commission in the principal case
(considered by the court as an interim committee) was created
by statute in accordance with that decision.
Since most state constitutions contain a provision similar to
that of California, prohibiting members of the legislature from
holding any other office of trust or profit,13 the question may arise
in other jurisdictions, especially where the commissions consist
of members and non-members of the legislature. In a commission
composed of ten members and five non-members (as is the usual
case) the non-members of the legislature might very well hold
the balance of power in the commission and thus the policy of
the legislature would be controlled by outsiders. Such a com-
mission might be considered an extra-legislative body, and legis-
lators serving on it considered as holding a new office. But such
a result, in the opinion of the writer, would be very unwise, be-
cause the power to appoint a committee composed of private
9. In re Davis (1897) 58 Kan. 368, 49 Pac. 160; People v. Backer (1920)
113 Misc. 400, 185 N. Y. S. 459; People v. Hofstadter (1932) 258 N. Y.
425, 180 N. E. 106, 79 A. L. R. 1208; Terrell v. King (1929) 118 Tex. 237,
14 S. W. (2d) 786; Sullivan v. Hill (1913) 73 W. Va. 49, 79 S. E. 670,
Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1115.
10. That is, they are passed by both houses and are signed by the gover-
nor, thus having the effect of law. For example, see Tex. Const. (1876)
Art. IV, §15.
11. Dickinson v. Johnson (1915) 117 Ark. 582, 176 S. W. 116, L. R. A.
1915E, 496, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1067; Stockman v. Leddy (1912) 55 Colo.
24, 129 Pac. 220, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1052; Fergus v. Russel (1915) 270 Ill.
304, 110 N. F. 130, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1120; Ex parte Hague (1929) 105
N. J. Eq. 134, 147 Ati. 220; State v. Gayman (1908) 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep.
59.
12. (1939) 90 P. (2d) 313.
13. For a collection of state constitutions, see New York State Constitu-
tional Convention Committee, Constitutions of the States and the United
States (1938) ; for phraseology of the usual provision, see Pa. Const. (1874)
Art. II, §6 ("Civil office"); Ill. Const. (1870) Art. IV, §3 ("Lucra-
tive office except justice of the peace or notary public"); Mich. Const.
(1909) Art. V, §6 ("Any office under United States or this State"). The
Mo. Const. (1875) art. IV, §12, is similar to the Michigan provision, and
reads, "No Senator or Representative shall, during the term for which he
shall have been elected, be appointed to any office under this state, or any
municipality thereof; and no member of Congress or person holding any
lucrative office under the United States, or this State, or any municipality
thereof (militia officers, justices of the peace and notaries public excepted),
shall be eligible to either house of the General Assembly, or remain a mem-
ber thereof, after having accepted any such office or seat in either house of
Congress."
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citizens as well as legislators has been held to rest upon the doc-
trine that a committee may appoint all outside help or counsel
needed to accomplish its purpose, 4 and to hold differently would
seriously hamper the legislature in handling an important part
of its work, namely interstate cooperation. Moreover, the com-
missions as so composed demonstrate an actual development by
the states, within the framework of their present separation of
powers, toward accomplishing a degree of the executive-legisla-
tive coordination thought desirable by political science theorists.15
R. S. S.
EFFECT OF CIVIL RIGHTS OF PARDON IN FORUM FOR
CRIME COMMITTED IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION
Defendant was convicted of a felony in a federal court. For
this crime he would have served two years in a federal peni-
tentiary, but was released on a federal parole after serving part
of his term. The full period of his sentence having expired, he
was issued a certificate of restoration of the rights of citizenship
by the Kentucky governor, and he thereupon sought nomination
for the position of sheriff in a county in that state. Plaintiffs
contended that by virtue of his conviction he became disqualified
either to vote or hold office under the constitution and laws of
the state' and could not be nominated in the primary election
because of such disqualification, despite the gubernatorial pardon.
Held, that even though the conviction was in the federal court
of a federal crime, the disqualification which resulted, viz., the
14. The court so held in Terrell v. King (1929) 118 Tex. 237, 14 S. W.
(2d) 786, where the legislature directed the payment of expenses of a Tax
Survey Committee, composed of legislators and non-legislators, from its
contingent fund. Held, this was a proper exercise of the committee power
of the legislature. The California court in the principal case uses strong
dictum to the effect that such is the view of that court.
15. For example, section 29 of the Model State Constitution (National
Municipal League (1921)) would provide for a legislative council composed
of seven legislators and the governor.
1. Ky. Const. (1891) §§145, 150. Section 145, part 1, provides: "Persons
convicted in any court of competent jurisdiction of treason, or felony, or
bribery in an election, or of such high misdemeanor as the General Assembly
may declare shall operate as an exclusion from the right of suffrage" shall
not have the right to vote; "but persons hereby excluded may be restored
to their civil rights by executive pardon."
Section 150 provides: " * * * All persons shall be excluded from office
who have been, or shall hereafter be, convicted of a felony, or of such high
misdemeanor as may be proscribed by law, but such disability may be re-
moved by pardon of the governor." These are typical constitutional provi-
sions of the American states. Cf. Mo. Const. (1875) art. VIII, §2.
1942]
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